The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 has been published recently. 125 countries from the non – OSCE world were analyzed in accordance to some specified topics such as stateness, rule of law, welfare regime or resource efficiency. Each country is broadly discussed in a country report, which can be downloaded on the website. I downloaded the report for the Kyrgyz Republic and I read it and I wanna discuss it.
First impression: not too bad at all. On 23 pages the (unnamed) author(s) present(s) analyses of various political and economic fields, highlight(s) recent trends in the overall development of Kyrgyz society and risk(s) some prognosis for the future. In addition I must say, that I am very happy to see, that the report does not follow the general argument on the Tulip Revolution, which accounts the ouster of President Akaev a mere change of power and reproduction of an authoritarian system. I agree with the report, when it states:
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The change in power that occurred in 2005 has opened up new opportunities for Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, events since then have demonstrated that there is no easy way forward for a country that is relatively poor in resources, whose political and economic elite seems united only in the effort to secure access to those resources, and that is located in a difficult region as far as governance and economic policies are concerned.
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When it turns on the international donor community I have to give my plazet as well:
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While continued support for advocates of democratization and civil society activities is certainly a good idea, bilateral donor governments, as well as international financial institutions, have a built-in preference for assisting a fragile incumbent government in delivering badly needed services, thus inadvertently strengthening the position of the ruling elite. Although this is undoubtedly an important task given Kyrgyzstan’s poor record in sectors such as education, health or employment, it will be of vital importance for the future of Kyrgyz democratization to give this support without simultaneously weakening the political opposition and giving indirect incentives for the incumbent government to back down on earlier commitments to competition.
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Indeed, too often money just flows down the executive branch without ever causing some change in infrastructure or administrative efficiency. I remember one guy from some bilateral donor organization, brought to Kyrgyzstan for assistance to the ministry of finance in regulating its tax reform. He received a day salary of 600 USD and was working 100 days in a year. He didn’t speak Russian, no Kyrgyz, had no idea of Kyrgyzstan whatsoever and was obviously more interested in getting acquainted with local females than thinking of improving the Kyrgyz tax code. But, ok, I missing the point here: there are often structural problems in development aid. Most aid, lets take for example aid to the educational system, strengthens the executive branch in its chairs without causing anything good to political pluralism. In the case of educational help, the idea is to transform poor educational facilities into production sites for future independent citizens. It doesn’t work, cause the effect is too big on the wrong side and much too small on the right one. The AUCA could be a good counter example. Although the university sucks many brilliant students out of the country it still produces a mass of highly qualified young people, who demand their share in the process of shaping the country’s future. However, this is only possible, because Soros and the State department came in with big money and big plans. The losses of brilliant brains is compensated for by many others who stay and put pressure on the ruling elite.
Back to the BTI report on Kyrgyzstan. Everybody who is interested in getting an idea of what actually is going in Kyrgyzstan and especially those who are interested in economic performance are recommended to have a look at the report. No argue here.
However, there are some points I would like to criticize. In general these are concerned with the constant reproduction of views on the development of independent Kyrgyzstan. The report starts with the story of a freedom loving, democracy promoting regime around a liberal minded president called Akaev in a new-born country called Kyrgyzstan. After some years, the story goes, Akaev turned illiberal and put pressure on free media and started to amass wealth for himself and his close family members. In the end, a colored revolution had to end an emerging authoritarianism.
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In fact, the country achieved some remarkable successes in bringing about political transformation. Civil rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were effectively introduced. Freedom of religion and freedom of conscience were also guaranteed. Citizens gained new opportunities to express their interests openly and legally, make their grievances known and suggest alternatives. Legislative and presidential elections were mostly free and fair.
By the mid-1990s, however, there was a backlash against liberalization, marked by legal changes intended to increase the authority of the president, sideline the opposition and manipulate elections. Parliament was deprived of power. Its responsibilities were limited, its legislative rights curtailed and its oversight functions reduced to a minimum. It was excluded from the government-building process. With the persecution of some independent journalists as early as 1997, the freedoms of speech and of the press were gradually restricted. Increasingly, positions of political authority and economic power came under the control of the president’s “family,” a euphemism for the narrow elite affiliated with Akaev either through kinship or personal loyalty.
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This is a story, I have heard too often; and the more I hear it, the less I can agree with it. The mechanisms of rule didn’t change that much between the early 90ies and the late 90ies. Just read the brilliant (because exceptionally detailed) book from Kasym Isaev or once again carefully examine reports about the gold scandal in 93/94 or remember how president candidates were illegally excluded from the presidential election in 95. It was not that different from what happened later.
I think other factors are responsible for our different perceptions. The early nineties were accompanied with hope, having Akaev as the only non-party apparachik at the top of an independent -Istan. The state administration did not have full control of what is happened in the country. That was compensated for by an underdeveloped media system, which was not able to cover on all the dirty details of Akaev’s manipulations (just remember the selling out of Kumtor to Cameco) in that period. Later unfulfilled hope turned into disappointment. What once looked like a starting point for progress was now considered the beginning of regress.
So, my advice would be to reflect on our conditions for observation and not to attribute every change to the object of our study. Neither Akaev miraculously transformed from the liberal to the illiberal nor were his power practices subject to radical change in the course of his15 years rulership. Much of the story, which repeatedly is told about independent Kyrgyzstan, depends on our starting point for observation. Perhaps next time, the author(s) of the BTI can just ignore this call for repetition and spend more space and analytical skills on current events. It is here, where the reader (probably) awaits interesting interpretations and conclusions. And it is here, where I would like to ask some additional questions regarding some of the statements made by the BTI report. But more on that later ….
