The BTI 2008 on Kyrgyzstan – Some Critical Notes (I)

The first point I would like to discuss is concerned with the agent- centered approach taken by the author(s). The report states:

The country has the opportunity to consolidate its path toward democratization; it has already taken significant steps with the re-introduction of free speech, equal political rights and political competition in the spring of 2005. However, Kyrgyzstan may fall back to a more authoritarian type of political order if the country’s elites prove unable to forge a consensus on the future “rules of the game.”

[Page 2]

and some pages later:

It will largely depend on the choices of a few political leaders whether these latest developments mark the beginning of a new period of cooperation between government and parliament, or whether they herald the end of a temporary truce of political forces that will now give way to power struggles and renewed instability.

[Page 4, my emphasis]

I feel uncomfortable with these statements. It gives the impression that the fate of Kyrgyzstan is in the hands of some elite representatives leaving the „masses“ aside. It is a typical political-science approach which usually forgets about the „others“ (non-elite representatives) and prefers to concentrate on some few „factors“ (read: elite actors) instead.

Elite pacts have become a very popular concept to explain transition outcomes and regime developments. However, they all share the problem of rendering society meaningless while misconceptualizing and thus overrating the political system. One short look at the current political elite of Kyrgyzstan tells any observer that no democratic progress will be made … at least if one binds the fate of democracy to the decisions of some elite representatives and their wisdom for patriotic negotiations.

Society needs to be included into the analysis and its structures (i.e. expectations) need to be explored. The November rebellion (almost not mentioned in the BTI 2008) should be better understood as the last attempt of oppositional elite representatives to change (hier: ändern) the political systemic logic by connecting their demands to society’s expectation for change (hier: Wandel) after experiencing the change (hier: Wechsel) of leadership in March 2005.

Taking such a perspective we are able to differentiate between the November events and those of April 2007 (not referred to in the BTI report, because it covers events only till February 2007). At that time society’s hope for change was already gone (to get an impression of what I mean compare comments on Internet sites like www.pr.kg or kg.akipress.com for example). And former Prime Minister Kulov had long lost its credentials, when he refused to join the protesters in the November rebellion some six months earlier.

Now it is interesting to see, if Kyrgyzstan opens once more the doors this spring for a season of mitingi. If we want to find out, th first thing we should is to dedicate more time and energy for an observation of the structures within Kyrgyz society. The society sets the limits, constructs the frame, within which an elite might take some actions (or might refuse to do so because the support from the society is perceived as unstable or even missing). Solely concentrating on elite means overemphasizing its role and usually leads to distorted perceptions of the political system within a given society.