When Education Kills …

Last week I received news about the death of a young schoolgirl. She was visiting school No. 70 in Bischkek, which is located on Bakonbaeva / Manasa. The school is known for its good reputation. Which is a problem. It is the reason why many concerned parents try to place their kid at that particular school. At least here classes are taught and teacher do come to work. A friend of mine, who got his younger sister on that school now reports high level of motivation from the side of his sister.

However, one problem becomes obvious: the school is overpopulated. Classes consist of 40 and more students and teachers are overcharged with the task to control this load of teens. The directorate tries to prevent more students from entering the school (I witnessed it, when my friend got his sister put there) but one call from somewhere up the educational (or political) hierarchy and the question is settled. Certainly money also plays a role, too. Today, the school hosts double the amount of students that it is actually formally allowed to.

Since control can’t be exerted (too many students) and kids from rich parents meet those who are just living in the region and therefore have the right to a place, the atmosphere is somehow fraught with tension. Recently organized raids among the kids have become a problem in particular (next to organized fights between groups of (male) students from different schools). The ‘cool’ guys pick a victim and force it to pay them money, they tease it and sometimes they beat it up. As far as I heard, this problem is widespread. The directorate tries to work on the problem by inviting parents and informing them about the raids.

Unfortunately this was not enough for a little girl of 12 years. She jumped out of the window of the fourth floor of the building where she lived with her parents. She was presumably heavily mobbed by students from the school and so despaired, that she allegedly tried to hang herself. Her father saved her that time. Several days later she jumped.

Now the big question is: who is responsible for the death of a 12 year old girl who could not find another exit out of her misery but to commit suicide. The school directorate? Surely they could have done more to get people engage and work on the problem. What about the parents in all this? Actually I don’t dare to judge them. All I heard is that they were well off, so that usual cut and dry opinions probably don’t work in this case (like poor parents or alcohol or absolute carelessness).

It is easier to see the politician’s guilt in this tragedy. A teacher who is starting to work at a school after coming from the university gets a salary of some hundred som. Not enough to make a living. That’s why most of them start to work a second job. Or they start to sell grades. Most schools can’t prevent their teachers from doing so because the directors know that the salary is not enough. Or they participate in the grade selling. As a consequence, many schools provide only basic education and are not considered to be good. Some seem not to function at all.

More money is needed for the educational system. Why not reducing the numbers of ministries and state agencies and using the saved money for the educational system? Or using money from the presidential administration’s extern budget (made up of grants and privatizations). Or perhaps closing the administration at all? Using all the money for the schools! (it is quite a lot, what the tax payer has to pay for the presidential administration, which is doubled in its functions by the premier’s administration, which itself is mirrored by the ministries of the government). Finally deciding on the structure of the educational system which in itself today is regulated by many contradictory rules, where one type of school (like the tekhnikumy) is under direct control of the ministry of education (i.e. Ishengul’ Boldzhurova) whereas others are supposed to be regulated by local bodies (РОО); the municipalities have to pay for TeploVodaEnergia, the rayon decides on the director, the director on the teachers, which are paid by the central state. Some more coherence in the structure of the educational system (without reference to the question of centralized or decentralized) would probably lead to an optimized performance of the overall system.

The result could be less stress and more self confidence from the side of the teachers, more school selection options for the parents and, consequently, more motivation from the side of the students. It remains to be seen, if the current government under Chudinov is willing to spend more time on the needs of the educational sector and if Ishengul’ Boldzhurova can dedicate herself to a long lasting reform. So far it seems that Chudinov is fully occupied to privatize what has been left of the state’s strategic assets and Boldzhurova criticizes the current situation but without suggesting a way out of the crisis.

A reform of the educational system is neccessary. The tragic case of the young girl should alert the legislators and the executive branch to finally do something about the ever deteriorating situation. Before another teen is so despaired that she decides to kill herself and jumps …

On European Parliament and Kyrgyz Marshrutki Drivers

On April 12th AKIpress informed its readers about the European Parliament’s intention to cooperate with the Zhogorku Kenesh, probably on issues, already taken care of by special programs realized by UNDP and the European Comission. The same day AKIpress broadcasts a story about the protest of some hundred marshrutki drivers, who demand to increase ticket prices for a marshrutki trip up to ten som (almost 20 EuroCent) from now five som.

You wonder what the connection is between the two? In my opinion it is a brillant example of bad opportunities for development aid – but realized; and good opportunities for development aid – but even not recognized. The cooperation between EU Parliament and Zhogorku Kenesh promises to fail entirely like all its predecessors (actually being counterproductive) whereas the conflict of the marshrutki drivers could serve a testing field for new development-aid instruments aiming at better articulation and aggregation of real (cause related to material needs – „how to feed a family“) interests.

The marshrutki drivers in Bishkek do have a real problem. They are too many, there income depends on the numbers of passengers they transport and next to hungry kids at home they have to feed hungry chinovniki higher up in the city administration (greetings to Мэр Daniyar Usenov), hungry representatives of various controlling bodies (TekhObzor, GAI, etc.) and the ever hungry global market of increasing gas prices. The last point in particular became a problem recently, since gas prices increased in Kyrgyzstan 10% – 15% in 2007. And it is likely that they will increase even further, taking into consideration higher demand on the world market. The state company Kyrgyzneftegaz promised stable prices for gas for 2008, but that promise was made in January this year.

Transport service has always been tough in Bishkek. Thousands of Taxi drivers compete with marshrutkas and trolleybuses. The income for drivers of mashrutki and taxis depends on the number of passengers they serve. That pushes every marhsrutki driver first of all to stop wherever a possible client is waiting and waving his/her hand. Against all traffic rules of course. And it encourages them to carry as many passengers as possible. Correspondingly a marshrutka that is build to carry 15 passengers can be found stuffed with more than 25 clients. No need to mention an ever increasing level of aggression on all sides and thus high danger for car accidents.

It would be absolutely interesting to find more about this whole system called public transport in Bishkek. I remember a marshrutka driver, who was serving the road between Bishkek and Kant. He explained to me, that he has to complete an technical test, a breathalyzer test and one more test (don’t remember what it was) every morning before he starts driving. Obviously neither he (breathalyzer test) nor his marshrutka (technical check) were undergoing those tests. He told me, that he payed 5 som for each test as a bribe, so to get the necessary stamp. And then would start to work … – Really, I think it would be great to have some detailed information on the whole system, especially about the corruption chains starting from the poor driver up to … well, wherever it ends.

Development aid could work on this issue, building contacts to western-based union-representatives. Another option could be the organization of public space so for the protesting drivers to articulate their demands. And the organization of even more publicity with the hope to aid the aggregation of these real interests.

However, EU parliamentarians are more concerned with the fostering of good relations with the Zhogorku Kenesh deputies. Someday soon, the EU Parliament wants to send a delegation to conduct some discussions on what to cooperate on and what for. I think it will do what the EU commission is already doing (and is proud of):

„Основной целью Парламентского проекта Европейской комиссии и ПРООН является оказание долгосрочной технической помощи Жогорку Кенешу КР в целях усиления его потенциала для исполнения возложенных на него представительской, законодательной и контрольной функций.“

This basically means that EU is providing computers for the Zhogorku Kenesh administration (perhaps for some deputy’s assistants as well?) and some more technical stuff (printer, copy machine, some new technology for the recording section). At least this time they can trace where the new technology has gone, once the parliament is newly elected. Speaker Adakhan Madumarov is responsible for the ZhK administration and its officials.

The second sentence is about the cooperation for enhancing the ZhK’s potential to fulfill its controlling function. That is ridiculous. It would have been a sign of political protest, if the EU Parliament forced the European Commission to end all its activities regarding the Zhogorku Kenesh after the december elections. Now we have a rubber stamp parliament, where the speaker feels himself king, the ruling party (two-third majority) doesn’t care and the two pseudo oppositional parties are too small and too unwilling to really engage in political fight (most ridiculous the former communists under Iskhak Masaliev).

It is even worse, since the new parliament voted for a new statute, that grants the right to speak in front of the parliament only to heads of committees, initiators of legislative acts, the heads of the factions and the speaker and his deputies. That means, that basically every deputy has been deprived of his right to represent! … and thus to control!

So, why cooperation, if the structure doesn’t allow for it (next to the fact, that politically none is willing to exert control)? Control follows the political will to monitor the power holders. This will can’t be found in the parliament today. It is part of the executive branch and will not go for open conflict, as long as Bakiev pleases the deputies of his party Ak-Zhol. The political will is outside the parliament, some part of it is left in the dying opposition movement, the rest can be easily found in overstuffed marshrutki.

(p.s.: perhaps someone should propose to the EU Parliamentarians not to stay all day in Hyatt Regency Hotel in Bishkek (big fence around the building so that the EU representatives can not get in touch with the outer reality!) but actually try to make a ride with a marshrutka, let’s say with the 214 from Zapadnyj Avtovokzal through Osh Bazaar to Alamedin Bazaar. On a hot day, around 5pm.

I am sure they would feel the difference!)

AIDS – Ein Tragödie in 72 plus 16 Akten

Das erste mal hatte ich von dieser Geschichte im Sommer letzten Jahres gehört, als die ersten AIDS Kinder identifiziert worden waren. Nun bin ich vergangene Woche über eine Reportage von Leila Saralayeva gestolpert, die das Thema noch mal aus einer anderen Perspektive aufgreift.

Hintergrund ist die Infektion von Dutzenden von Kindern im Süden Kyrgyzstans mit HIV. Verseuchte Spritzen waren wohl die Infektionsherde und das marode Gesundheitssystem inklusive skrupelloser Ärzte und indifferenter Politiker bedingende Ursache. Laut dem Report wurden 72 Kinder registriert, die sich mit dem Virus in den Kliniken angesteckt haben. In der Folgezeit übertrug sich in einigen Fällen das Virus mit der Muttermilch auf die Mütter. Die erwähnte Indifferenz und tragische SPÄTerkennung waren hier die entscheidenden Faktoren.

Saralayeva beleuchtet das Schicksal der 16 Mütter. Sie leben eine dreifache Tragödie: die Krankheit ihrer Kinder müssen sie verbergen (ihre eigene natürlich auch), anders als ihre Kinder werden sie von der kostenlosen Verteilung von antiretrovitalen Medikamenten ausgeschlossen und schließlich, wie in zwei Fällen, die Saralayeva beschreibt, haben die Männer ihre Frauen nach der Nachricht über die Infektion verlassen.

Was bleibt ist die Rückkehr in das Elternhaus, wenn dieses gewillt ist, die infizierte Heimkehrerin aufzunehmen. In Kyrgyzstan ist die Angst vor Aids hoch, die Kenntnisse über die Krankheit liegen aber in der Regel bei Null. Inoffiziellen Schätzungen zufolge liegt die Zahl der Infizierten bei über 6 000, die Tendenz ist steigend aber von einer Epidemie spricht man bisher nicht.

So wenig aufklärendes Wissen auch kursiert, Gerüchte über HIV und Aids sind verbreitet. Vor allem Ausschluss aus der Gesellschaft, häufig gerade auch von Nahestehenden veranlasst viele Aids Kranke, sich hinter einer Wand des Schweigens und Ausredens zu verstecken. Weiß die nähere Verwandtschaft über die Krankheit bescheid, mischt sie in diesem Spiel tatkräftig mit und bemüht sich um das Verbergen der wahren Krankheitsursache aus Angst vor sozialer Diffamierung.

Aufklärung tut hier bestimmt Not, aber wie die zu Bewerkstelligen ist, bleibt unklar. In Internetforen bekommt eine Aktion zur kostenlosen Verteilung von Kondomen sofort den Kranz des westlichen Kulturimperialimus umgehängt, der die wahre (traditionale, islamische, religiöse oder einfach: reine) Gesellschaft zerstören möchte. Vor diesem Hintergrund laufen viele Aktionen ins Leere und bereiten eher der Front der Ablehner den Boden als den Kranken einen Ausweg aus ihrer verzweifelten Lage.

Vielmehr sollte generell an Maßnahmen zur Verbreitung von Information gebastelt werden. Mehr Öffentlichkeit muss gewagt werden, mehr Foren zum Austausch über was auch immer für Themen produziert werden. Um allein die Hoffnung nicht fahren lassen zu müssen, dass auch Themen wie Konservativität oder Religiosität und ihr Verhältnis zu modernen Entwicklungen nicht ohne breite Resonanz in der öffentlichen Meinung bleiben.

Erst dann kann wohl auch die Hoffnung entstehen, dass Pluralität mehr Anstöße zur Reflexion bietet und daraus resultierend alte Konventionen ad acta gelegt werden. Ohne dass man dafür gleich den Kulturkampf bemühen muss.

Den Kindern aus den Krankenhäuser von Osch und anderen Städten in Südkyrgyzstan hilft das auf die schnelle nicht und sicherlich auch nicht ihren Müttern. Hier ist Hilfe vom Staat oder externen Akteuren gefragt. Ich hoffe, dass sich genügend Staub aufwirbeln lässt, damit die selbstgenügsamen Deputierten des Zhogorku Kenesh das Problem aufgreifen und die Exekutive zu der ein oder anderen Korrektur ihres Vorgehens zwingt. Der Blick in die Vergangenheit allerdings lässt diesbezüglich gehörige Zweifel aufkommen.

Das aber ist bitter für die verlassenen Mütter von Osch.

Adakhan Madumarov übt den Autoritarismus

Adakhan Madumarov, seines Zeichens Sprecher (Toraga) des Nationalparlaments (Zhogorku Kenesh), ließ heute (7. April 2008 ) bei einer Pressekonferenz verlautbaren, dass weder die Zentrale Wahlkommission (ZIK) noch das Verfassungsgericht sich vor irgendjemandem zu rechtfertigen hätten. Was an sich schon verstört, wenn es aus dem Munde einer Amtsperson kommt, die jener Institution vorsteht, die sich vom Wahlvolk beauftragt sieht, möglichst alle anderen Institution auf Herz und Nieren zu überprüfen und auch zuständig ist (zusammen mit dem Präsidenten natürlich; … wir sind schließlich in Kyrgyzstan, ohne BAKS geht nichts!) für die Ernennung von Kadern, hat einen besonderen Hintergrund.

Seit Ende Dezember wartet der mündige Wähler in Kyrgyzstan darauf, dass die ZIK endlich die genauen Ergebnisse der Parlamentswahlen vom 17. Dezember in die Öffentlichkeit schreit. Und zwar nach Wahlkreis und Wahlbezirk aufgelistet. Das aber weigert sich die Wahlkommission zu leisten, dabei auf ungeheure Zahlenmassen und die Unmöglichkeit kompletter Verarbeitung verweisend.

Das nervt die Opposition, genauer gesagt, die Opposition in Form von Ata-Meken. Diese Partei unter Vorsitz von Omurbek Tekebaev hatte am 17. Dezember 8,5% der Stimmen erhalten, konnte aber wegen einer extra eingebauten Prozenthürde für die sieben Regionen (und die Städte Bischkek und Osch) nicht in das Parlament einziehen. In Osch verfehlte die Partei die nötige Anzahl der Stimmen um einige hundert. Und das bedeutete das Aus für die Vertretung von mindestens 8,5% des Wahlvolkes.

Mindestens, da bei den ganzen Wahlmanipulationen, zu denen es bei den Wahlen kam, eigentlich alle davon ausgehen (Ausnahme sind die Wahlbeobachter jener Missionen mit russischer und chinesischer Rückendeckung) dass Ata-Meken weitaus mehr Stimmen bekommen hat. Davon abgesehen aber hat Ata-Meken auch Kopien der Wahlprotokolle jener Wahlbezirke, in denen die Partei angeblich nicht genügend Stimmen gesammelt hat (Wahlbezirke in der Stadt Osch). Und die Angaben auf diesen kopierten Wahlprotokollen ergeben ein anderes Bild. Demzufolge hat Ata-Meken ausreichend Stimmen gesammelt und hat entsprechend Anrecht auf Einzug in den Zhogorku Kenesh.

Das aber will Madumarov nicht, weil sein Herr und Gebieter, BAKS, es auch nicht will. Ganz im Sinne dieser Einstellung redet sich Adakhan in die Höhen und Tiefen autoritärer Ideologie. Bei seinem Statement bezüglich der Rechtfertigungsbefreiung von ZIK und Verfassungsgericht unterschlägt er großzügig die Artikel 48 und 77 des Wahlkodex’, in denen die Pflicht der ZIK zur Veröffentlichung der Ergebnisse von Parlamentswahlen (entlang der Wahlbezirke und Wahlkreise) in den öffentlichen Massenmedien festgehalten ist. Der stellvertretende Chef der Partei Ar-Namys Emil Aliev erinnerte erst jüngst an eine Anfrage, die seine Partei (Ar-Namys war bei den Wahlen auch unterlegen gewesen) Anfang März an die ZIK abgeschickt hatte. Ohne je eine Antwort darauf zu bekommen.

Madumarov legt in letzter Zeit immer mehr solche autoritären Züge an: Während des Wahltages träumte er vom einem Einparteienparlament. Im Zuge der Neustrukturierung der Geschäftsordnung des Parlaments massierte er Vollmachten bei sich und entzog den Parlamentariern das Recht zum Reden. Westliche Demokratiepromoter werden von oben herab abgekanzelt (hier muss man sagen: häufig zu recht) und während der Sitzungen nimmt sich der Hausherr immer häufiger das Recht, selber die zur Diskussion gestellten Fragen der Komiteevorsitzenden (jene besitzen das Recht der Rede) fix zu beantworten. Bloß keine Debatte aufkommen lassen. Das könnte das schöne Bild von einer an Todesstarre ähnelnden Stabilität gefährden.

Und daran ist seinem Herrn und Meister, BAKS, doch so sehr gelegen!

The BTI Report on Kyrgyzstan – Some Critical Notes (III)

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index follows most analytical reports when it comes to the parliamentary and presidential elections in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005. It states:

„Yet up until the parliamentary elections of March 2005, the electoral process – including registration of candidates, access to the media and the ability to campaign freely in all parts of the country – was severely biased in favor of pro-regime candidates and drew criticism from international election observers for falling short of important standards for a free and fair vote. The first post-Akaev presidential elections in July 2005 marked a significant step forward to a fair electoral process. Given the extraordinary “post-revolutionary” atmosphere of that vote and the predictability of its outcome, however, it remains to be seen whether strongly contested elections will be conducted at the same standard in the future.“

[Page 6]

I am sure that the unfolding of the Tulip Revolution was caused by the manipulations that the Kyrgyz public witnessed prior, during and after the elections at the end of February 2005. However, I think it is justified to ask, if more manipulation of or more competition in the elections were triggering the public outcry. Whereas in previous elections the Akaev regime could much more effectively organize its manipulation machinery, this time it was struck by the fact, that most mandates were wanted by numerous candidates who were loyal to the president’s family.

In Karabalta (a town close to Bishkek, where I did most of my fieldwork) three main candidates actually were all on good terms with Akaev. Taalajbek Subanbekov had his big brother Bakirdin (nickname: Bakirdinbank) as minister of interior at his service, Vladimir Tolokoncev was a loyal Russian deputy of the legislative chamber of the Zhogorku Kenesh, and Valerij Dil’ as the head of the German minority community (and member of the upper chamber of the Zhogorku Kenesh) served as a well established bridge to the German motherland. According to one informant, all three were on good relations with Alga Kyrgyzstan, the new and very soon-to-be-dead party of power, built and lead by Bermet Akaeva.

Well, all these big guys were fighting for one mandate in the same district. They all used dirty tricks. Subanbekov the police forces and his connections to the criminal authority of the region, Almaz; Tolokoncev his support by then head of town of Karabalta Tishchenko (mobilizing voters and local election commission members); and Dil’ his good connections to German medical services, distributing medicine for free short before the elections. They all did, what actually anybody does in Kyrgyz elections. The difference this time was, that no one withdrew while the campaign unfolded. Usually the candidate with backup from the presidential administration has most resources on his disposal and makes sure, that competitors feel this decisive difference before the election day comes. In the end, everything looks more or less peaceful, and there is no real need to worry about the results since everybody knows who wins.

This time, with a lack of guidance from the presidential administration, candidates fought there way up to the day of the election. in Karabalta, Subanbekov won, probably because of his backing in the ministry of interior. But like in many other districts, people became publicly aware of all the dirty mechanisms that can be used in elections. It was corruption all over again, but caused by higher competition in the field of candidates. Not because Akaev was favoring one candidate over another (though that was the case in many southern districts!).

A total different picture is provided by the presidential elections of July 10, 2005. There was one candidate only, Kurmanbek Bakiev; well, and some puppets. There was no competition at all, but the campaign seemed to be running according to the markers of peace and stability. The OSCE was very happy!

In Karabalta the local newspaper of the rayon administration published one issue after next, full of allegedly politically concerned inhabitants of the region, advocating the campaign of the „Tandem“ (Bakiev and Kulov) and calling in on everybody to vote for Bakiev. Knowing something about the conditions of how this newspaper is produced it is difficult to believe that those articles had a real substantial base.

I am not saying, that Bakiev made them do it. I believe, they anticipated it, not being able not to anticipate it exactly this way. Reading all this articles, this calling-ins from some old babushka from a village in nowhere, asking her fellow babushki to vote for Bakiev, it became clear to me, that the presidential administration had not changed a bit and was all about creating an atmosphere of creative anticipation again. Didn’t the OSCE see it coming?

in summa, I can understand the author(s) of the BTI report when they choose to follow OSCE’s ratings. It’s just: it becomes boring reading the same stuff over and over again. There is no impulse for new thinking. It seems more like pressuring concentrated knowledge in form of supposed to be scientifically recognized opinions into the reader’s head; instead of posing new questions that can make us think. So, my advice for next time: bring up some material you can’t explain and try to develop some questions in regard to it. And then let others find the answer (yeah, why not creating interactive reports? … well, that sound like a whole new project …