Wahrheit und Fiktion in der Kyrgyzischen Republik

Klar, es ist Präsidentschaftswahlkampf und man muss als Regierender zumindest so tun, als wolle man um die Stimmen der Wähler buhlen. Nötig hat es der amtierende Präsident Bakiev aber nicht, schließlich garantiert ihm eine meinungsfreie Öffentlichkeit und ein startbereiter Manipulationsapparat sowohl die Abwehr möglicher Konkurrenten (vom Schlage eines Atambaevs oder auch eines Temir Sarievs) und zugleich einen fantastischen Sieg mit überraschend hohen Stimmwerten.

Um so mehr verwundert es, dass sich BAKS (Bakiev, Kurmanbek Salievich) hinablässt auf die Ebene billigsten Populismus. Er brüllt geradezu ins Land, dass ab dem 1. Juli die Renten um 50% angehoben werden. Also keine feine, in Abstimmung mit möglichen demographischen oder steueraufkommenstechnischen Veränderungen vorgenommene Anpassung der Sozialausgaben, sondern brachialer Bruch mit der Vergangenheit, auf in die lichte Zukunft per Ukas. Verdient haben es die Rentner und Rentnerinnen in Kyrgyzstan natürlich. Das steht ganz außer Frage. Von den 10 Euro 50 kann man im Monat eh nicht so richtig leben. Genauer gesagt, es lebt sich verdammt beschissen. Jubel und Dankbarkeit also jedem, der solch Verbesserung einführt. Und das freut den alten und neuen Präsidenten.

VorWahlKampf

Gegen Ende dieser Woche traten erste Anzeichen für eine bestimmte Richtung der kommenden politischen Entwicklungen in Kyrgyzstan an die Oberfläche. Ich meine die Entwicklungen bis zur Wahl des neuen Präsidenten der Republik am 23. Juli 2009. Sowohl das amtierende Staatsoberhaupt und seine Mannschaft als auch die bunte Truppe der Oppositionäre haben etwas als mehr drei Monate, um entweder jeglichen Zweifel an der Wiederwahl des „Первый Колхозник“ auszuräumen (das wäre die von der Macht favorisierte Entwicklung) oder aber Zweifel zu streuen und den Mitgliedern der Präsidentenmannschaft den Schweiß auf die Stirn zu treiben (Ziel der Opposition).

Bakiev, das scheinen letzte Aktionen der Machtmannschaft zu indizieren, setzt auf Populismus. Ziemlich offen wird erklärt, dass man erst einmal die Stromabschaltungen einstellen wird bis nach den Wahlen. Auch die Einführung geplanter Erhöhungen für öffentliche Transporte will man verschieben auf Januar 2010. Eine Reportage über den Besuch des Gubernators der Region Chuj Bolotkan Kurmanov in der Provinzstadt Karabalta überschlägt sich fast in der Aufzählung unzähliger Überproduktionen der örtlichen Unternehmen, dem Hinweis auf anstehenden Produktionsbeginn bei zehn weiteren neuen Unternehmen und überhaupt der tollen Ausgangslage für zukünftigen Erfolg in  er Stadt. Zamirbek Esenamanov, der neuen Akim des Zhajylskij Rajons und in 2006 und 2007 noch Financier der Opposition tut sein Möglichstes, um dieses Bild von Karabalta auszuschmücken.

Kein Strom aber 5-Jahres Pläne

Heute kamen gleich zwei interessante Nachrichten über den Ticker der größten kyrgyzischen Nachrichtenagentur AKIpress. Einmal wurde berichtet, dass Kazakhstan, was nördlich an Kyrgyzstan angrenzt, seinen Ausstieg aus dem zentralasiatischen Energieverteilungsnetz verkündet hatte. Anlass war wohl nach kazakhischen Angaben die illegale Entnahme von Strom durch tadzhikische Stellen (südlich an Kyrgyzstan angrenzend). Für Kyrgyzstan ist diese kazachische Maßnahme ein Problem.

First Tensions Rising

It is summer pause in Kyrgyz politics. Politically hot times are spring and autumn, times in which the Zhogorku Kenesh, the national parliament, tries to debate and times in which politicians try to use the public attention to bring forward their wired claims. In addition in autumn the weather usually is not as hot as it usually uses to be during July or August in Kyrgyzstan. Put differently: demonstrating on the streets is easier, when the sun is not burning the protesters to death. So, naturally, it is rather calm right now in Bishkek and the rest of the country.

However, recent announcements, by government and opposition politicians alike, seem to express some form of nervousness regarding future political developments. Former and perhaps new opposition leader Almazbek Atambaev not long ago stated that the government should do more on the rising food and energy crisis if it does not want to be kicked out of office by another revolution. President Bakiev today, on the 24th of July, gathered the cabinet of ministers and heavily criticized them for not fulfilling orders (i.e. plan-fulfillment). Those were given in January 2008 and strictly ordered the ministers to secure the economic growth rates of 2007. But out of 53 measures to be taken by the ministers only 48 have been realized so far (although the Kyrgyz government consists of 14 ministers, the prime minister and his deputIES (plural!)).

Unfortunately the capitalist economy is as unrulable as is the command economy, especially when it is integrated into global capitalist economic processes. And thus today predictions for the future Kyrgyz economy are dark, purely dark. The inflation rate is expected to increase to 29% by the end of the year, the export rate in this year rose by 18%, whereas the import increased by 40%, causing a huge imbalance in the country’s external trade figures. With unstoppable rising food and energy prices, with a lack of water in the main water reservoir (Toktogul’skoe Vodokhranilishche: July 2008 – appr. 9 trillion m²; July 2007 – appr. 13.3 trillion m²) and surely not enough gas being supplied by Uzbekistan in the upcoming winter, tensions within the political debate slowly start to rise.

Today’s gathering was a first initiative by president Kurmanbek Bakiev to demonstrate strength. His order to hand in a list with ministers who are not fulfilling their duties (meaning: not saving the country’s economy from the inevitable) indicates to a possible cabinet’s reshuffle in the nearer or at least not so distant future. So far the Minister for Economic Development and Trade (such a ministry really exists!) Zhaparov was heavily criticized by the president himself as was his colleague, Minister for Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources (!) Saparbek Balkibekov. With prime minister Igor Chudinov being a pure puppet in Bakiev’s hand it is even likely that a new prime minister will be selected soon. November or December would be a good time for a new prime minister. The reason for the selection of the date would be as follows: the new prime minister just entered office and his duty is only to mitigate the consequences of the crisis which has been created by others (Chudinov & Co.). No miracles can be expected of him since he just started his term. This way, everybody can be blamed, but no one takes responsibility. And when the crisis is done, the crisis prime minister will be dismissed and a new party apparatchik gets the position. This interpretation explains the crisis as a chance for the power system, which regularly requires position reshuffles to satisfy all co-optational needs in the political sphere.

Perhaps the old crisis prime ministers Atambaev comes in for a second term? It seems unlikely, since it is difficult to sell such an appointment to the public. More likely is the appointment of one of the leaders of the opposition campaign, that is expected to gain momentum in September this year. However, being aware of the catastrophy in Tadzhikistan last winter, most people probably will spend all their time getting prepared for the cold period and not paying attention to oppositional claims. With no public getting into protest mood, opposition leaders have no chance to lead. In that case another party apparatchik (perhaps a woman? why not Bakiev’s loyal soldier Elmira Ibraimova?) would absolutely fit for the position.

The BTI 2008 on Kyrgyzstan – Some Critical Notes (II)

On Page 6 the report states:

„Yet the proper functioning of administrative structures is hampered by low funding, corruption and the subversion of formal institutions by informal patronage networks at all levels of government, from the national level down to the local self-government layer of administration. In general terms, awareness among civil servants of the importance of good governance has been raised by a public debate over corruption. Administrations work more effectively in some areas than in others, some institutions are less corrupt than others, and some territories are better governed than others.“

Some short comments are in order:

First, it has been always clear to any observer of Kyrgyz Politics, that corruption is massively present in almost every state administration, starting with the ministry for emergency situations (МЧС) and ending in the National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic for the Prevention of Corruption. When I interviewed one of the officials in this agency in Spring 2007 he explained, that of 25 investigations, conducted by the agency, only few of them actually were handed over to the Genprokuratura and only in one case proceedings were instituted.

I have to admit, that in the last time, the fight against corruption gained momentum. However, headlines like „Начальник отдела Управления ГКНС подозревается в вымогательстве взятки“ (http://kg.akipress.org/news/54383) are only proof of a new tendency to put more effort into the simulation of reform and state action. In fact, not one of the guys, recently mentioned in the list of the hundred richest people in Kyrgyzstan in the newspaper De-Fakto have been brought before court. Former state ministers like Bakirdin Subanbekov (served as minister of interior under Akaev from 2002 – 2005) or Zhanysh Rustenbekov (former minister for emergency situations, today ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan) could be questioned. How actually did they manage to get included in the mentioned list, when they spend all their years of profession as state officials in numerous state agencies?

Summarizing this discussion up, i want to make the conclusion, that the awareness among civil servants of the importance of good governance has not been raised by the public debate. It just led to a reformulation of strategies of manipulation to deceive the public; certainly it leads not to attempts to engage into a „real“ fight against corruption (and how would that b e possible taking into consideration the structure of the political system. It is build upon rent-seeking mechanisms and corruption is its main income generator).

A last comment is necessary regarding the sentence about differences in the performance of different state agencies. My question to the author(s) is: could you give us examples? And if you can, could you give us please some references? It would be interesting to find out, which territory actually is better governed than others (or worse). And if one is able to clearly mark differences in the performance of different administrations it would be great to find out more about the reasons for such differences. Perhaps the BTI Report 2010 will provide us with some answers to these questions!