Omurbek Tekebaev Criticizes Recent Changes in Kyrgyz State Structure

Usually the most sophisticated analyses of the political situation in Kyrgyzstan are provided by the leading members of the Socialist Party ‘Ata-Meken’ (Fatherland). Not long ago I posted an article from Vice- Chairman Alymbekov, in which the former Vice Speaker of the Zhogorku Kenesh discusses the advantages of democracy and disadvantages of authoritarianism using an approach that borrows some of its terms from systems theory.

This time the leader of Ata-Meken, Omurbek Tekebaev, steps forward with a trenchant critic of Kyrgyz president Bakiev’s plans to reform the government and most of the state apparatus. His analysis first sheds light on trends in Kyrgyzstan’s history of independence before deconstructing the myth behind the slogan of progressiveness and reform in Bakiev’s actions. Tekebaev points out the meaning behind some special changes. He highlights the role of the new ‘Central Agency’ that will take over management of all financial resources and that will be responsible for forming the budget without being subject to any further (public) control. He also directs attention to the new ‘Development Fund’, which will be headed by former Prime Minister Igor Chudinov and supervised by former State Channel Director Melis Eshimkanov. This fund will be the new gate for all foreign money to enter into Kyrgyzstan and like the activities of the Central Agency, it will not be subject to any control. Such fact alone should make all donors stop sending (useless) development aid to Kyrgyzstan.

Tekebaev’s comment did not remain unheard in Kyrgyzstan. Though published only at www.centrasia.ru and at the website of the Social Democratic Party, the Genprokurator found out about it and now considers an investigation against this ‘last opponent’ for alleged defamation of the president. This reaction by the law enforcement agencies was answered by the head of the Human Rights organization ‘Kylym Shamy’, Aziza Abdirasulova, who issued a press release, condemning the actions of the Genprokuratura and supporting Tekebaev’s right to freedom of expression.

Tekebaev’s article starts as follows:

To download the full article as pdf follow the link: Report_OmurbekTekebaev

The Statement from ‘Kylym Shamy’ reads as follows:

Roza Otunbaeva compares recent changes in government structure with return of the Kokand Khanat

This comparison outraged many deputies from the ruling parliamentary group ‘Ak-Zhol’. Ulugbek Ormonov and Askarbek Shadiev accused Otunbaeva of unfounded criticism and warned her not to divide the people:

‘What does it mean the Kokand Khanate appears? [...] Don’t divide the people! If you ask around, we are all relatives! We are a little people, we should stick together! Today is the time to increase the wealth of the people and the economy of the country!’ (Ormonov)

Shadiev seconds:

‘Why does the opposition speaks only of bad things, about the shortcomings of the president and his relatives? You need to be blind to not to see how extensively our roads are built everywhere in the republic. Today the capital is improved and for the first time „Kambar-Ata-2″ is realized. [...] To contend that someone is somehow ruling is wrong. We shouldn’t divide the people! We have one and the same aim and task! In times of economic crisis we have to close ranks and get out of the crisis.’

Interesting to see, how representatives of ‘Ak-Zhol’ constantly refer to the unity of the people, being afraid that someone might actually introduce some form of difference (and thus disunity). It is the prerogative of the opposition to criticize and thus introduce an alternative perspective. It is not only the prerogative of the opposition, it is main genuine job opposition has to fulfill. To deny this prerogative simply means to reject opposition at all. One might add that such strategy realizes itself as the arrival of the Kokand Khanate, Otunbaeva was speaking about.

A second very interesting moment is the rejection of any reference to misbehavior of the president and his family. Today it becomes difficult in Kyrgyzstan not to see the parallels between Bakiev’s regime and Akaev’s regime who promoted his relatives into central positions within the state apparatus as well. With his son Maksim now being responsible for all question of state finances and foreign investments and his brother Zhanysh heading decisive parts of the security forces, one can hardly deny that the political regime in Kyrgyzstan resembles more and more a family-run business organization, and less a modern polity. And the fact that Ak-Zhol members furiously react to any reference made to these developments simply confirms that all observers in Kyrgyzstan perceive it exactly like that.

The Venice Commission’s Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic

The Website of the Venice Commission features an archive that contains past opinions and draft laws the Commission was asked to conclude upon. Among the many documents that deal with legislation in the Kyrgyz Republic is also the document titled CDL-AD(2007)045 Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic adopted by the Commission at its 3rd Plenary Session (Venice, 14-15 December 2007). This report provides a short comment on the changes to the constitutional foundations the Republic underwent in September and October 2007.

It diplomatically but nevertheless clearly criticizes the constitutional court for its decision on 14 September 2007 in which it abolishes the two constitutions adopted on 9 November and 30 December 2006:

The report continues questioning the democratic character of the constitution adopted during the referendum on 21 October:

It finally concludes that the presidency in the Kyrgyz Republic is much too powerful and nearly uncontrolled in its actions:

The report is an interesting document that helps to question the legitimacy of the current regime in Kyrgyzstan that by proclamation adheres to the principles of democracy but in its decisions turns more authoritarian with every year.

To download the full ‘Opinion’ in pdf follow the link: Opinion_Venice_Commission_Dec2007

Kyrgyzstan auf dem Weg zum Feudalwesen

Man ist schon ein wenig geschockt. Da tritt der kyrgyzische Präsident vor dem Parlament auf, erklärt die größte administrative Strukturumwandlung seit Jahren, und es bleibt ruhig. Sowohl in der Öffentlichkeit als auch auf analytischer Ebene. Sicher, die Ansammlung präsidialer Bewunderer mit Namen Ak-Zhol drückte ihre zutiefste Zufriedenheit aus ob der angekündigten Pläne. Und der ein oder andere Experte erklärte, dass das alles grandios sei, was passiere, dass endlich die Reform beginne, oder aber man verdammte alles als Simulation von Wandel, der gar keiner ist.

So langsam aber macht sich der Eindruck breit, dass tatsächlich ein Wandel vollzogen wird. Der flächendeckende Raub an der Gesellschaft wird in formale Strukturen gegossen. Es entsteht die politische Figur eines Feudalwesens, bei dem sich die herrschende Familie als offiziellen Machthaber feiern lässt und sich in der Exploitation der Untergebenen engagiert.

Entscheidend bei dieser Neugestaltung der Strukturen der exekutiven Macht im Staat ist nicht allein die zunehmende Unterordnung von Regierungskompetenzen unter die direkte Kontrolle des Präsidenten, sondern auch die Besetzung entscheidender Stellen in der mit der Verwaltung dieser Kompetenzen betrauten Agentur mit Verwandten des Präsidenten. Wie ein Kommentar in der Zeitung ‘Delo No. ..’ konstatiert, befindet sich mit dem Bruder des Präsidenten Zhanysh Bakiev als ihrem Leiter bereits eine der unbekanntesten Sicherheitsagenturen des Landes, der ‘Dienst für Staatlichen Schutz’, unter der ausschließlichen Kontrolle der Familie Bakiev. Nun wurde mit der Ernennung von Maksim Bakiev, dem älteren Sohn des Präsidenten, auf den Posten des Direktors der neu geschaffenen ‘Zentralen Agentur der Kyrgyzischen Republik für Entwicklung, Investitionen und Innovationen’ auch die Verwaltung der staatlichen Finanzströme in Familienhände genommen. Spekuliert wird außerdem auch darüber, dass mit Marat Bakiev, dem zweiten Sohn des Präsidenten, in Bälde der Staatliche Geheimdienst, reorganisiert als ‘Staatlicher Dienst für nationale Sicherheit’, von einem Familienmitglied der Bakievs geleitet werden wird.

Sicherheitskräfte und Finanzströme unter der Kontrolle einer Familie, an deren Spitze ein Politiker steht, der 2005 im Zuge der Tulpenrevolution antrat mit dem Versprechen, Vettern- und Günstlingswirtschaft zu beenden. Sorgevoll stimmt bei dieser Entwicklung weniger die Tatsache, dass hier passiert, was in den anderen zentralasiatischen Ex-Sowjetrepubliken bereits die Norm ist, sondern die Brutalität und Zielgerichtetheit, mit der dieser Umschwung von Statten geht. Bakiev schreit geradezu hinaus in die Öffentlichkeit, wie wenig in die Meinung selbiger interessiert. Ungebunden durch formale Restriktionen und umgeben von einem Herr opportunistischer Politiker wie der Brüder Kongantiev, dem Toraga Aitibaev, Abgeordneten wie Masaliev, Isabekov, Ormonov, Torobaev und Zijadin Zhamaldinov und schließlich ewigen Autoritaristen wie Madumarov oder Sutalinov, kann sich der Präsident es nun erlauben, öffentlich die Plünderung der verbleibenden Ressourcen im Land in Angriff zu nehmen.

So wird beispielsweise nicht nur der Staatliche Geheimdienst komplett der Verwaltung des Präsidenten untergeordnet, die von Maksim Bakiev von nun an geleitete ‘Zentrale Agentur’ übernimmt auch so primäre Regierungsaufgaben wie die Erstellung des nationalen Budgets, womit die (theoretisch mögliche) Kontrolle durch das Parlament der Vergangenheit angehört. In Verbund mit der durch Maksim von heute an verwalteten Aufgabe der Betreuung von Investitionen kann man nur hoffen, dass bei der anstehenden Plünderung des Volksvermögens in Form von Privatisierungen Brotkrümeln abfallen, die sich vielleicht als Effizienzsteigerung der sowieso schon völlig maroden Infrastruktur des Landes realisieren.

Allerdings: zu befürchten steht das Gegenteil. Und sollte dann jemand protestieren wollen, bekommt er Besuch von Bakievs Verwandtschaft.

Some Oppositionists Still Keep On Fighting In Kyrgyzstan

Recently Kyrgyz President Bakiev announced wide ranging plans to change the government structure. Following his declaration the government under prime minister Igor Chudinov resigned, making way for new personnel. Eventually the cabinet reshuffle was not as big as expected. The only surprise was Danijar Usenov, head of the presidential administration, being nominated for the position of prime minister by the Ak-Zhol Party, Bakiev’s political stronghold. Since Ak-Zhol holds a comfortable majority in the Zhogorku Kenesh after stealing its way into the parliament in December 2007, Usenov got his final approval and now is busy completing his new cabinet, appointing neither new candidates nor representatives of the opposition.

The opposition in Kyrgyzstan seems to observe the developments as a mere bystander. So far I haven’t heard anything from a member of the opposition. Either they can’t make it into the public anymore, since all media is state controlled, or they are afraid of being pursued by the Genprokuratura or the GKNB. However, it seems that there are still some individuals left that try to withstand the ever growing power of the current regime in Kyrgyzstan. What is more surprising is that those individuals can be found amidst the paralyzed mass of parliament deputies that so much tries to resist becoming what it is supposed to be – a lively forum for political debate and conflict.